William Spring v. Sealed Air Corp by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-29-2012 
William Spring v. Sealed Air Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"William Spring v. Sealed Air Corp" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 926. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/926 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3828 
_____________ 
                         
WILLIAM SPRING, 
              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SEALED AIR CORPORATION 
doing business as 
CRYOVAC, INC.                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5-10-cv-04655) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: May 29, 2012 )                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
Plaintiff William Spring appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant on Spring’s claims under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) and Pennsylvania state law.  Spring also appeals from the District 
. 
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Court’s denial of his motion to amend his complaint in order to add a claim under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
Spring worked as a bag sealer for defendant, Cryovac, Inc.  He injured his back at 
work on November 26, 2008.  Two days later, Spring visited his doctor, who diagnosed 
him with muscle strain, prescribed him some medication, and advised him not to return to 
work.  Nevertheless, Spring reported to work on November 30th.  That day, he told his 
supervisor that he had injured his back, but did not tell him that he injured it while at 
work.  
On December 1st, Spring suffered an adverse reaction to his medication.  He 
consulted his doctor, who told him not to work and gave him a new prescription.  Spring 
called his employer on December 1st and 2nd, and informed Robert Blackton, Spring’s 
shift supervisor, that he would not be at work.  On December 3rd, Spring’s doctor 
permitted him to return to work.  Spring informed Robin Nagle, an employee in 
Cryovac’s human resources department, that he would return to work on December 4th.  
Spring and Nagle discussed Spring’s need to designate the missed days as leave under the 
FMLA.  Spring also visited with Nagle on December 3rd, and had his doctor fax her a 
note stating that his injury was work-related.  Nagle referred Spring to Robert Weaver, a 
Cryovac safety supervisor, to investigate whether Spring’s injury was work-related.  
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Weaver asked Spring whether he reported the injury to anyone, and Spring answered that 
he did not.1
On December 3rd, George Homa, the production manager at Cryovac, suspended 
Spring for failing to immediately report a workplace injury, in violation of Cryovac’s 
written policies, pending a further investigation into the violation.  According to the 
policy, “all injuries, no matter how minor must be immediately reported to the 
Department Supervisor.”  (App. 21a.)  Spring was aware of the written rules, and had 
been told orally about the policy.   
   
After Spring was suspended, Blackton recommended to Homa that Spring be 
terminated in light of his performance history, which contained many instances of safety 
and disciplinary violations.  The regional human resources manager, Timothy Reich, 
explained that Spring was being terminated in part because he “alleged an accident 
occurred on November 26, 2008 but he never reported anything about this ‘accident’ until 
December 3, 2008 . . . . Because of his long history of safety issues, as well as his 
numerous counsellings [sic] and progressive discipline history, the Reading management 
group is recommending termination.”  (App. 28a.)  On January 2, 2009, Homa called 
Spring and told him that he was being terminated.   
Spring had previously taken FMLA leave, from January 5-29, 2007, May 25-July 
6, 2005 and in March 2004.  No adverse employment actions were taken against him 
around those time periods. 
                                              
1 However, during his deposition, Spring testified that he notified Blackton and a 
different Cryovac employee on December 1st and December 2nd that his injury occurred 
at work on November 26th.   
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In September 2010, Spring sued Cryovac for violations of the FMLA and for 
retaliatory discharge under Pennsylvania law.  On the defendant’s motion, the District 
Court dismissed Spring’s state-law claim.  Then, Spring requested leave to file a second 
amended complaint in order to bring a claim for discrimination under the ADA.  The 
District Court denied his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.  In 
September 2011, the District Court granted summary judgment for Cryovac on Spring’s 
FMLA claims.  Spring filed a timely notice of appeal.2
II. 
 
A. State-Law Claims 
Spring argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his state-law claim for 
retaliatory discharge.  We review the District Court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss de novo.  Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Spring contends that under Pennsylvania law, which recognizes an exception to the at-
will employment doctrine for a termination based on filing a workers’ compensation 
claim, he also has a claim for retaliatory discharge.  See Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 
1232 (Pa. 1998) (holding that an at-will employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for 
the filing of a workers’ compensation claim has stated a cause of action under 
Pennsylvania law). 
The Pennsylvania courts have yet to enumerate the elements of a retaliatory 
discharge claim based on seeking workers’ compensation benefits.  As such, we will 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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employ the familiar burden-shifting framework for a retaliatory discharge claim under 
Title VII.  See Landmesser v. United Air Lines, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277-78 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000).  Thus, Spring must establish: (1) that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that 
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal connection 
between his protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.  See Shellenberger v. 
Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003). 
The District Court correctly concluded that Spring failed to show a causal 
connection between his initiating a claim for workers’ compensation (when he reported 
his work-related injury to his employer) and his being terminated, as the record makes 
clear that he was suspended and ultimately terminated not for seeking workers’ 
compensation, but for failing to immediately report a workplace injury and for a history 
of safety issues.   
Nevertheless, Spring asserts that Cryovac’s firing him for failing to immediately 
report a work-related injury constitutes retaliatory discharge because under 
Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation laws, an employee has up to 120 days to report a 
work-related injury in order to initiate a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.  See 
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 631.  He requests that we certify two questions to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asking (1) whether an employer’s policy requiring 
immediate notification to supervisors of all workplace injuries violates § 631; and (2) 
whether the defendant’s actions here violated the exception to at-will employment for a 
termination based on filing a workers’ compensation claim. 
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We do not read § 631 to forbid an employer to require that injuries be reported 
more quickly as part of the employer’s safety polices.  While the statute permits an 
employee to provide notice within 120 days for the purpose of obtaining workers’ 
compensation, nothing in the statute indicates that the Pennsylvania legislature meant to 
prohibit employers from implementing more timely work-related injury reporting 
requirements for the purpose of safety.  Spring was aware of the policy requiring injuries 
to be reported immediately, and he was fired for not complying with that policy.  As 
such, we will decline Spring’s request to certify questions to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, for we will not “‘ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a statute.’”  
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 152 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1987)).   
B. FMLA Claims 
Spring argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the 
defendant on his claims for interference and retaliation under the FMLA.  We review the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the 
District Court.  Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).   
1. Interference 
To assert an interference claim under the FMLA, the plaintiff need only show that 
“he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that he was denied them.”  Callison v. 
City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).  Terminating an employee for requesting 
FMLA benefits can constitute an interference claim, but an employer is not liable under 
the FMLA for terminating an employee during or at the end of his FMLA leave when the 
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reason for termination is not related to the employee’s use of FMLA.  See Sarnowski v. 
Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 403 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that a plaintiff 
will not prevail on an interference claim if the defendant can establish that it terminated 
the plaintiff “for a reason unrelated to his intention to exercise his rights under the 
FMLA”).   
Spring argues that Cryovac interfered with his ability to take FMLA leave 
because, he alleges, Nagle never gave him FMLA paperwork or designated his time off 
as FMLA leave.  While whether Nagle provided Spring with FMLA paperwork is 
disputed, it is irrelevant because nothing in the record establishes that Spring was denied 
FMLA leave.  If anything, the record suggests and the parties seemingly assume that 
Spring did take FMLA leave from December 1st to December 3rd.   
Moreover, the record establishes that Spring was suspended and terminated after 
he completed his FMLA leave, for reasons unrelated to taking that leave.  As in 
Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 148 (3d Cir. 2004), 
where “the record clearly indicate[d] that [the employee] would have been discharged 
absent any consideration of his . . . FMLA-protected leave,” here too, the record indicates 
that Spring’s termination had nothing to do with taking FMLA leave.  Because a plaintiff 
will not prevail on an interference claim if the defendant can establish that it terminated 
the plaintiff “for a reason unrelated to his intention to exercise his rights under the 
FMLA,” Sarnowski, 510 F.3d at 403, the District Court was correct to grant summary 
judgment for Cryovac on Spring’s interference claim. 
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2. Retaliation 
To establish a retaliation claim under the FMLA, the plaintiff must show that: (1) 
he invoked his right to FMLA benefits; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; 
and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the invocation of his rights.  
Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 146.  Where, as here, the plaintiff offers no direct evidence of the 
retaliation, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies.  See Atchison v. 
Sears, 666 F. Supp. 2d 477, 490 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  The District Court found that, under 
that burden-shifting framework, Spring failed to show that Cryovac’s proffered 
nondiscriminatory reasons for suspending and terminating him—failing to immediately 
report a workplace injury and a history of safety and performance issues—were 
pretextual. 
Spring argues that Cryovac’s policy requiring immediate notification of workplace 
injuries is evidence of pretext because it permits the employer to terminate any employee, 
essentially in its discretion who fails to immediately report an injury.  Spring also argues 
that terminating him in accord with the policy is evidence of pretext because it violates 
77 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 631.  The District Court was correct to reject these arguments.  
Given that the reporting requirements had long been in place and Spring was aware of 
them, it was not a post-hoc justification for terminating Spring.  Moreover, whether the 
reporting policy violates § 631 is irrelevant; a workplace policy requiring immediate 
reporting of injuries, and a state statute providing more time to report injuries for 
purposes of workers’ compensation, do not undermine Cryovac’s nondiscriminatory 
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reason for firing Spring, nor show that his taking FMLA leave was a motivating reason 
for his termination.  
C. ADA Claim 
Finally, Spring urges that the District Court erred in denying his request for leave 
to file a second amended complaint in order to add a claim for discrimination under the 
ADA.  We review the District Court’s denial of leave to file the second amended 
complaint for abuse of discretion.  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Spring recognizes that his ADA claim would normally be barred because he did 
not file a claim with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, but argues 
that he meets the requirements for equitable tolling, which may excuse his 
noncompliance with the EEOC filing requirement where (1) the defendant actively 
misled the plaintiff respecting the reason for the plaintiff’s discharge; and (2) this 
deception caused the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the EEOC filing requirement.  See 
Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2007).  Spring contends that Cryovac 
actively misled him by failing to advise him that his accumulation of safety rule 
violations was an additional reason for his termination.  To that end, Cryovac also hid 
from him an email exchange from 2008 in which supervisors at Cryovac discussed the 
effect of Spring’s heart condition on his ability to perform certain tasks at work.  Spring 
contends this email exchange is significant because shortly after this exchange, Spring 
was written up for disciplinary violations.  However, Springs points to no evidence which 
supports these assertions, and there is no evidence showing that Cryovac actively misled 
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Spring.  Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that Spring is not entitled to 
equitable tolling, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Spring’s request for leave to 
file a second amended complaint. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
